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Improved company performance must be at the heart of any successful transition from a
command to a market-oriented economy. The standard pattern in the transition economies has been
to seek improved companies by heightening competition and sharpening corporate governance in
various ways: through privatization of state-owned firms; by allowing and encouraging new firms
and competition between existing firms; and via the withdrawal of government subsidies so that
firms must face their own profits and losses -- what is referred to in this literature as a "hard budget
constraint."
However, this pattern has had mixed success. The ability of these reforms to improve
corporate performance appears highly sensitive to the institutional environment and initial
conditions in which the policies were introduced, along with the specific nature of the policies
enacted. As Djankov and Murrell (2000, pp. 69) write of the experience in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), which is made up of Russia and 11 other nations that were formerly
republics of the Soviet Union: "[P]rivatization, hardened budget constraints and product market
competition all appear to be important determinants of enterprise restructuring in non-CIS
countries, while they are less effective in the CIS.  We hypothesise that the difference in impact is
due to varying degrees of institutional development between the regions." Similarly, while
privatization seems to have improved company performance in almost all developed and middle
income countries, the record is less convincing in transition economies, and notably in the former
Soviet Union (Estrin and Wright, 1999; Nellis, 2000).  Once again, the reason relates to the forms
of privatization used and variations in the legal and institutional environment.
The transition economies make a particularly good laboratory for understanding the
dynamics of market evolution and for evaluating the impact of alternative policy frameworks
(Djankov and Murrell, 2000).  It is useful to distinguish two elements in microeconomic transition:William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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the restructuring of existing activities and the reallocation of resources (Commander, Dutz and
Stern, 2000).  Restructuring entails enhanced performance within existing firms through changes in
objectives, incentives and constraints on managers and results from ownership changes, though
improvements also depend on the resulting ownership structure, the legal and institutional
arrangements for corporate governance and the nature and performance of the capital market. 
Reallocation of resources depends more broadly on whether the market structure is competitive and
on the rules and institutions affecting entry, exit, bankruptcy and the competitive interactions
between incumbents, as well as the trade regime and government policy with respect, for example
to enterprise subsidies. The two forms of restructuring are related because success in the
development of institutional and legal frameworks for corporate governance and capital market
regulation is likely to be associated with success in promoting competitive entry and exit, as well as
effective competition and trade policy.
This paper explores the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of
company performance in transition economies.  These include the initial conditions; the forms of
privatization; the institutional and legal framework, especially the corporate governance structure;
the relationship between the private sector and the state; and the competitiveness of product
markets, including the impact of international trade. 
The Legacy of Central Planning for Enterprise Reform
At the beginning of the transition process, the functioning of the centrally planned economy
was well understood (for example, Ellman, 1989). But in retrospect, the implication of this heritage
for subsequent microeconomic behavior was probably underestimated. 
In most communist countries, the allocation of resources was primarily through quantity-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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based planning.  There was no market in the supply of goods, either for final products or
intermediates. Labor was effectively rationed via an internal passport system. Capital was allocated
centrally through a single institution, typically described as a "monobank." Firms were not
autonomous decision-making units; it is better to conceive of them as production units within an
economy that was run as a single giant firm.  Firms were not financially independent and did not
have the responsibility for sales or pricing.
Central planning left behind a legacy of grave difficulties for market-oriented reform. Since
planners provided the mechanism whereby supply and demand were intermediated, firms rarely had
direct contact with suppliers, purchasers or final consumers.  These relationships, which form the
glue for a market economy, were therefore largely nonexistent when planning was abolished, and
there were significant transaction costs in their creation. One especially painful manifestation of the
lack of relationships with suppliers arose as part of the deep recessions that the transition economies
experienced in the early 1990s, when the disappearance of the central planners greatly disrupted
production, especially production with longer and more complex supply chains (Blanchard, 1997;
Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).
Not only were firms in a planned economy out of touch with suppliers, but they were out of
touch with consumers as well. The planning system was more aimed at the preferences of planners,
with a focus on heavy industrial production, than on the preferences of consumers. As a result,
major restructuring was needed in the transition process to bring supply in line with the patterns of
consumer demand.
1
The planning system also encouraged persistent excess demand for labor and capital, since
firms would ask for a high level of supplies and then expect the central planner to send them a
lower amount. Thus, there was no experience, either on the side of lenders or on the side of
borrowers, in decentralized allocation of investment. Instead, managerial incentives were focusedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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on production targets. Rewards for innovation or quality enhancement were weak or perverse; that
is, those who innovated were often expected to start meeting higher standards or quotas than those
who did not.
The structure of the planned economy did not permit competition, entry or exit. To ease the
informational demands of planning, firms in the communist economies were often gigantic and
vertically integrated in ways that would not have emerged in a market economy (Ellman, 1989). 
Small state-owned firms were rare and privately-owned firms were officially nonexistent.  Once
markets were liberalized post-transition, their structures were therefore highly concentrated. 
Moreover, the processes of competitive rivalry were weak or nonexistent. Entry was effectively
impossible, except if the state wanted to create a new firm. Exit was also usually impossible, given
the political objectives of full employment supported by a system of government subsidies to loss-
making enterprises (Schaffer, 1998). The political system fundamentally favored incumbent firms;
at the local level, relationships were very close between politicians and senior management
(Aslund, 2000).  The communist countries also typically experienced little competition from
foreign producers, since trade relationships across the Soviet bloc were governed and limited by a
communist planning arrangement called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
A final legacy of central planning was an impetus toward illegal activity. As early as the
1970s, a number of transition economies ran ongoing budgetary deficits, which meant that there
was more purchasing power in the economy than the official plan production could absorb. Since
prices were fixed, this excess of purchasing power resulted in shortages and in the accumulation of
monetary balances (Bennett, 1989).  These features, along with the other shortcomings of the
planned economy in meeting the desires of consumers, helped to create a black economy, which has
been associated with corruption and organized crime and which has persisted into the transition
period (Johnson, Kaufman and Shleifer, 1997).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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This legacy was not identical across the Soviet bloc, because central planning was
conducted in a variety of ways. Three of the largest differences across the transition economies
involved the extent and effectiveness of the planning system; the degree of openness of the
economy; and the institutional and legal traditions. 
Not all communist countries were centrally planned in the Soviet-type mould.  Yugoslavia -
- which has since turned into five successor states of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro,
Macedonia, Bosnia -- had adopted its own lighter form of economic planning in 1952, as did
Hungary in 1968 and Poland in the early 1980s.  In these countries, consumer preferences were
allowed to guide production decisions at least to a limited extent, so that the inconsistency between
the pattern of domestic demand and the structure of supply was less serious. In 1989, for example,
industrial production, much favored of central planners, represented 55 percent GDP in Armenia,
48 percent in Russia and 59 percent in Czechoslovakia, but only 36 percent in Hungary and 44
percent in Slovenia.  Moreover, in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in Hungary and Poland, some
progress had been made in establishing enterprises as autonomous units, with some responsibility
for employment, production, sales, exports and even investment decisions. However, there had
been only limited progress in incentives for managers or the imposition of financial disciplines.
2 
Poland took some steps toward allowing the entry of small private firms and Hungary even took
tentative steps towards an autonomous financial sector, though market structures even in these
countries remained everywhere highly concentrated (Newberry and Kattuman, 1992).  The
problems in establishing a market economy and the issues of black economy and corruption were
less serious in countries that had already decentralized the planning process.
Countries in the former Soviet bloc also varied significantly in their degree of openness to
international trade. A few countries were virtually autarchic; for example, in 1989 Albania exported
only 5 percent GDP of GDP and Romania only 12 percent, which are exceedingly low trade sharesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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for small economies in the middle of Europe. Other countries exported a larger share of GDP, but
mostly within the CMEA trading arrangement between Soviet bloc countries; for example, of
Russia's 28 percent of GDP that was exported, 64 percent was within CMEA, and of Ukraine's 30
percent of GDP that was exported, 82 percent was within CMEA. Other countries had relatively
high levels of trade, at least by the standards of the transition economies, and exported mainly to
developed western economies; for instance, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary
exported 24, 33, 24 and 28 percent of GDP, respectively, but 59, 50, 81, and 65 percent of these
amounts, respectively, went to western countries. These differences in trade clearly reflected the
extent of market interconnectedness, but they also reveal something about the levels of competition
in these economies and their levels of exposure to market-oriented business practices.
The transition economies also had significantly different histories, which was reflected in
their institutional and legal traditions.  Countries and areas from the former Austro-Hungarian
empire such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, southern Poland and Slovenia had a western European
legal tradition as well as a rich experience of capitalism prior to World War II. Indeed, these
countries typically already had a fairly complete (if outmoded) commercial code on the statute
books. However, most of the Balkan states had inherited a Turkish legal and institutional system,
with a less clear-cut or enforceable commercial code and rather less experience of the market
economy. Soviet experience with capitalism had been shorter, and was far more distant, so the legal
basis and the mindset for a market system in Russia and the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States was even more tenuous.
Many of the differences in initial conditions at the time of the transition away from
command economies tended to disfavor the former Soviet Union, and thus left an especially
difficult legacy for Russia and the countries of the CIS. As just mentioned, the Soviet economy had
especially inflexible and extensive central planning, relatively low openness to western trade, and aWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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market-unfriendly legal system. In addition, the Soviet economy was much larger and more
complex, in the sense of degree of vertical integration, than most countries of central Europe.  Thus,
the removal of central planning left a larger gap behind, which was a factor in the deeper and more
sustained output decline in Russia and the CIS in the 1990s (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Bevan et
al., 2001a).  Moreover, the size, population dispersion and the poor transport infrastructure of
Russia and many of the other CIS countries made it harder for international trade to play a pivotal
role in introducing competition. Many central European economies such as Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states looked to western Europe as a role model and therefore sought
speedy admission to the European Union, while Russia and the other states of the CIS did not. This
desire to become part of western Europe led to more accelerated trade reform, price liberalization
and enhanced competition policy in central European countries.
3 Finally, macroeconomic
imbalances were particularly severe in the Soviet Union, which meant that the extent of bottled-up
purchasing power was very large, and the black economy was deeply entrenched.
Enterprise Reform Paths
Improving company performance must mean, in part, providing incentives for efficient
behavior. Owner-managed firms, private firms and state firms each create a distinctive set of
incentives for efficiency.
Under owner-management, the prospects for accumulation and dissipation of firm-specific
rents through inefficiency, by managers or the labor force, are likely to be significantly lower than
in private or state firms, because owners have a direct incentive to keep a close eye on things. 
In some cases, ownership may be concentrated into the hands of banks, funds or families
who undertake monitoring of enterprise performance directly.  Such monitoring by a concentratedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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ownership blocks does not quite have the same powerful incentives for efficiency as actual owner-
management, but it can also work fairly well.
But when ownership and control are widely separated, then problems can arise. In a private
firm when hired managers have different objectives than the often diffused group of owners, then
managers will have an incentive to use firm-specific rents to satisfy their own objectives like
providing a low level of effort or gaining personal control over corporate income and assets. In
firms where workers have significant ability to share in company-specific rents -- for example, via
formal collective bargaining structures -- the focus of workers on higher wages or reduced effort
can also reduce efficiency or profitability (McDonald and Solow, 1985). 
However, a private ownership system also has a range of mechanisms for placing
significant limits on insider discretionary powers, including capital markets, statutes prohibiting
certain behaviors, transparent accounting procedures, and monitoring mechanisms.  The stock
market, for example, can be an important mechanism for corporate control. The quality of
managerial decision-making is an input in the choice of investors, whose judgement on company
performance is summarized in the share price.  If the managerial team is thought to be incompetent
or venal, the share price will be low relative to otherwise comparable firms, which can place
pressure on managers in various ways. Stock price can be linked to managerial pay and bonuses. It
can get a manager fired or hired. A persistently poor corporate performance can also encourage an
alternative managerial team to make a takeover bid.
A state-owned firm suffers from the separation of ownership and control in an especially
virulent way, and it is very hard for state economic planning to replicate the pressures that are
available to privately owned firms.  The state as owner often has ambiguous objectives -- say,
meeting an output quota, adding to employment, providing quality-of-life benefits to workers, and
not losing money. These various objectives can lead to the setting of inconsistent targets which, inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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the context of inadequate performance monitoring and governance structures, increases managerial
discretion (Estrin and Perotin, 1991).  The state may need to subsidize firms to ensure that the firm
reaches the range of desired outcomes, which can further dilute managerial incentives (Kornai,
1980). State-owned enterprises are not subject to private capital market disciplines, so the
competitively driven monitoring systems and the threat of takeover or bankruptcy is absent. 
Moreover, even though the state ownership stake is concentrated, the government rarely has people
with sufficient skills, resources, and clout to monitor efficiently or to enforce constraints on
insiders. 
These arguments have particular resonance in the transition economies. Under communism,
the monitoring of management and the incentives for efficiency were already weak. But with the
collapse of central planning and the lack of any other external constraints, managers and insiders in
transition economies gained almost total discretion to follow their own objectives, leading to "asset
stripping" by managers, job and wage guarantees for workers, and rent absorption by all parties.
This pattern was exacerbated in countries with a well entrenched black economy, and sometimes
led to a virtual “capture” of the state owned apparatus, including the natural resource and utility
sectors, by unscrupulous managers (Aslund, 2000).
The transition economies have tried in a number of ways to improve incentives for
efficiency. Privatizing state-owned enterprises is often thought of as a major first step toward
creating better incentives for enterprise efficiency, and in this section, we begin with a discussion of
privatization in the transition countries. However, as noted earlier, privatization is dependent on a
range of other policy changes and institutions to work well. Thus, we next turn to market-
supporting institutions, notably the encouragement of product market competition, international
trade and limits on government subsidies to the enterprise sector.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Privatization
At the beginning of the transition process, privatization of state-owned firms was widely
regarded as the most significant element of reform at a microeconomic level.  The Czech
privatization minister, Dusan Triska said in 1992 (as quoted in Nellis, 2000): "Privatization is not
just one of many items on the economic program.  It is the transformation itself." While in
retrospect this statement seems too sweeping, privatization is clearly a useful method to focus
enterprise objectives on profits and efficiency, to sharpen managerial incentives to attain these
objectives and to institutionalize a separation between the state and the enterprise sector. 
The sheer scale of privatization in the transition economies has posed a number of practical
problems.  After all, in the transition countries, privatization involved selling the bulk of firms in
the previously state-owned industrial sector. At the aggregate level, the stock of domestic private
savings in these countries was too small to purchase the assets being offered. Foreign direct
investment has rarely been available on the scale required, either (UN World Investment Report,
1999). In addition, the administrative capacity of transition governments -- many of them ruling
newly created countries -- to establish a suitable legal and institutional environment for
privatization, was also open to question (EBRD Transition Report, 1999; Estrin and Wright, 1999).
For a few selected firms, many transition economies used auction or public tender methods.
Such sales could in principle be to domestic or foreign purchasers but, in practice, only Hungary
and Estonia were willing or able to sell an appreciable share of formerly state-owned assets to
foreigners. Foreign capital ended up purchasing about 20 percent of the privatized assets in
Hungary and up to 50 percent in Estonia.  Even in these countries, the preponderance of foreign
ownership has given rise to considerable public disquiet. Because of the fear of foreign ownership,
sales of state-owned enterprises have mainly been to a country's own citizen: either to external
capital owners or to insider management-employee buyouts.  Managers and employees were theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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more common initial buyers, perhaps because they had insider knowledge about their company’s
business prospects. Some governments, with Romania as a prominent example, have also actively
encouraged the emergence of insider-owned firms with ownership centered upon trusts controlled
by managers and or workers (Earle and Estrin, 1996).
Rather than using auctions to privatize state-owned assets, some countries also
experimented with restitution to former owners; prominent examples include the former East
Germany, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Restitution has the advantage that it
immediately creates a property-owning middle class and re-establishes "real ownership."  However,
the process of restitution entails legal complexities. For example, suppose that a factory has been
built on a plot of land formerly owned by a farmer.  Does the farmer receive the land, and therefore
rental for the factory?  Should the farmer be compensated for the value of the property at the time of
its seizure, and if so how is such an evaluation to be made some 50 years later?  Restitution also
raises the deep question of how the assets accumulated during the communist era, when
consumption levels were held down for national capital accumulation, should be distributed.  Since
the burden of lower consumption was imposed on everyone, the argument that the distribution of
the resulting assets should be egalitarian has been a powerful one.
Problems in implementing the auction and the restitution strategies for privatizing led a
number of transition countries to attempt "mass privatization."  This approach entails placing into
private hands nominal assets of a value sufficient to purchase those state assets to be privatized.  To
avoid the inflationary consequences of such wide-scale "money" creation, the new assets must be
nontransferable and not valid for any transaction other than the purchase of state assets. This
method has usually been implemented via privatization vouchers or certificates. 
Mass privatization has been carried out in a number of different ways, which can be
categorized along three dimensions. The first issue is whether the vouchers or certificates areWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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distributed equally to the population as a whole or whether, as in Russia and many CIS states,
management and employee groups receive highly subsidized shares. Governments in these
countries used the offer of subsidized or free shareholdings to insiders to diffuse potential
opposition to privatization from managers and workers. Second, policymakers need to determine
whether vouchers can be exchanged directly for shares in companies, or whether the vouchers are
invested in funds that own a number of different companies. In the Czech and Slovak republics and
in Russia, vouchers could be exchange directly for shares, although financial intermediaries soon
emerged, offering their services to voucher-holders in the selection of share portfolios (Estrin,
1994; Coffee, 1996).  In the Polish scheme, citizens' vouchers were exchanged for shares in
government-created funds that jointly owned former state-owned enterprises.  Funds and other
financial intermediaries were expected to provide some counter to the dangers of ownership
diffusion inherent in a mass privatization scheme. A third question for mass privatization concerns
the mechanism whereby the vouchers would be traded for ownership rights in firms.  The Czechs
and Slovaks set up a computerized system to mimic a general equilibrium market clearing process,
so that shares in enterprises were transferred in waves comprising hundreds of firms simultaneously
(Earle, Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1993). In Russia, Ukraine, and many of the CIS states, firms
were privatized singly or in groups, at a time chosen by management. Insider control of the process
often led to nontransparency and insider domination of ownership.
Table 1 reports the methods of privatization used in the transition economies. Nineteen of
the 25 countries listed used some form of mass privatization as either a primary or secondary
method (Estrin and Stone, 1997).  Nine countries used management-employee buyouts as their
primary methods, with six more using them as their secondary method.  Only five countries used
direct sales as the primary privatization method -- and these five are among the most developed and
advanced transitional economies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Mass privatization was an excellent solution to the problem that state ownership was
omnipresent and domestic wealthholders were insufficient to buy the assets.  The mass privatization
strategy also facilitated an extremely speedy ownership change in most transition economies, as few
countries had contained a private sector of any significance in 1990. (Exceptions were Hungary and
Poland, where the private sector represented over 40 percent of GDP in 1991.) But in the transition
economies as a whole, the private sector contribution to GDP was usually less than 20 percent. The
resulting transformation, as traced in a series of reports by the ERBD (1994, 1995, 2000) is
extraordinary. As early as 1994, the private sector share was above 50 percent in nine countries:
again Hungary and Poland, along with Russia, the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Armenia, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. However, it remained true in 1994 that eight
former republics of the Soviet Union -- Belarus, Turkmenistan and others --- still had private sector
shares of less than 20 percent of GDP.  By 2000, the private sector in five additional nations had
reached at least 50 percent of GDP -- Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan -- and
only two laggards, Belarus and Turkmenistan, still had private sector activity below 25 percent of
GDP.
This remarkable performance should not conceal the real concerns about the extent and
quality of privatization, and therefore about its consequences for enterprise restructuring.  First,
much privatization remains to be done, especially of large-scale firms in the industrial sector and
utilities. When one looks at privatization of assets in large-scale enterprises, only in five transition
countries -- Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia -- were more than half of the
assets in large-scale enterprises in private hands by 2000 (EBRD, 2000).
A second issue is that even where a degree of privatization has occurred, in many transition
economies the state has continued significant shareholdings in companies.  For example, the
Russian state retained more than a 20 percent share in 37 percent of privatized firms, and kept moreWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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than a 40 percent share in 14 percent of the firms that it privatized (Earle and Estrin, 1997).  Only in
half of privatized firms did Russia sell its entire holding.  Bennett, Estrin and Maw (2000) report
the findings from a survey of privatized firms undertaken in every transition country in 1999.  In 20
of the 23 countries listed, the state has retained some shares post-privatization. On average, the state
retained some shares in around 20 percent of privatized firms, with more than a 20 percent
shareholding in around 12 percent of the firms.  Retained state shareholdings are negligible in some
of the leading transition economies: Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia. But the state kept a share
of more than 15 percent of privatized firms in Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, and more than 30 percent of privatized firms in Bulgaria, Croatia,
Slovenia and Uzbekistan.
But perhaps the most important problem with privatization is not that more remains to be
done (although it does). Rather, it is that the privatization has rarely led to effective corporate
governance mechanisms.  Indeed, Stiglitz (1999a, b) has argued that the long "agency chains"
implicit in mass privatization -- the many links that separate the citizen who receives a privatization
voucher from a company manager -- cannot provide appropriate incentives for corporate
governance.  Voucher privatization usually led to ownership structures that were highly dispersed. 
Typically the entire adult population of the country or all insiders to each firm, were allocated
vouchers with which to purchase the shares of the company (Estrin, 1994). In principle, it was
possible that financial intermediaries would aggregate individual voucher holdings and carry out
effective monitoring of management. Indeed, in Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia,
some effort was made to create such concentrated intermediate agents. However, even in this case,
it was not always clear who was monitoring the monitors. (Simoneti, Estrin, Bohm, 1999). To
quote Stiglitz (1997), "The voucher investment funds provided a vehicle for high power abuse."
The way that mass privatization was carried out in many countries often led to majorityWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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ownership by insiders. This was probably largely for political reasons (Boycko, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1995), especially in countries where the pro-reform forces were politically weak
(Bennett, Estrin and Maw, 2000). According to Earle and Estrin (1997), insiders held a majority
shareholding in 75 percent of firms in Russia immediately post-privatization (1994) and outsiders
only 9 percent.  Insider ownership predominantly took the form of majority worker ownership.
However, this created little problem for management because worker ownership was so highly
dispersed. Indeed Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse (1997) argue that control was effectively in the
hands of management in Russian employee owned firms, a hypothesis supported in Bevan et al.
(2001b).  Outsider ownership was also typically highly dispersed, with much of it in the hands of
banks, suppliers, other firms and an assortment of investment funds.
4
This pattern of extensive employee ownership seems broadly consistent with the evidence
for other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States.  In Ukraine, insiders owned 51
percent of shares in all privatized firms in 1997 -- managers 8 percent and workers 43 percent --
while outsiders held 38 percent and the states residual share was 11 percent (Estrin and Rosevear,
1999). 
The situation appears somewhat different in central Europe, although we lack the
accumulated firm surveys that are available for Russia. However, discursive evidence suggests that,
for example, insider and foreign ownership were predominant in Hungary, and insider and de novo
ownership in Poland. The Czech Republic is an alternative case where investment fund ownership
predominated. Takla (1999) carried out enterprise-level surveys in Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland that suggest such a composition of ownership of firms in these countries.
Thus, practical problems of privatizing most of the firms in an economy, combined with the
perceived political need to privatize and in an equitable manner, led to the widespread use of mass
privatization methods. But these methods failed to ensure the initial establishment of "a strategicWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
16
owner:" a single shareholder with sufficient stake to provide motivation for monitoring effectively.
Moreover, ownership structures have not been evolving towards concentrated outsider ownership.
For example, in Russia, outside shareholding has increased at the expense of the state and insiders
during the 1990s, but ownership is also becoming increasingly dispersed and the greater degree of
outside ownership may largely represent the fact that former insider voucher owners have left the
firm but retained their shares. In Ukraine, insiders have increased their shareholdings, though
concentration has slightly increased as managers have been buying shares from workers.  Thus,
rather than evolving towards the structure of a firms owned by a concentrated group of outsiders,
as was hoped by reformers (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995), enterprises in the CIS appear to
have remained primarily owned by dispersed groups of employees or outsiders.  This pattern
suggests major deficiencies in the legal, institutional and market environment in which the newly
privatized enterprises have been operating, which are hindering the emergence of efficiency-
enhancing ownership structures. The success of privatization in providing incentives for managers
has been linked to the existence of other institutional developments that have allowed dispersed
owners to monitor enterprise managers.
Institutional Developments Supporting Private Ownership
A number of authors have laid out what they see as the important institutional steps through
which dispersed owners can provide incentives for managers to act in their interests, rather than to
expropriate surpluses for themselves. For example, Stiglitz (1999b) emphasizes that with dispersed
ownership, one needs to see the rapid evolution of effective securities market and clear protection
of shareholder rights. Black (2000) outlines five institutions that he considers to be important to
permit effective monitoring is a situation of dispersed ownership: i) effective regulation of the
securities market; ii) accounting rules, independent audits, and extensive financial disclosure; iii) aWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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sophisticated accounting and banking profession; iv) a stock exchange with meaningful listing
standards; v) company and insider liability for false or misleading information. Many analysts also
emphasize that if minority shareholders are not protected, then controlling owners or managers 
have incentives to strip assets from the firm – for example, by selling the assets of the enterprise to
their own wholly-owned subsidiary at a knock-down price.
The situation in transition economies in these areas is perhaps best summarized by
indicators given by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the securities
market and non-bank financial institutions.  On a scale of 1-4, 1 represents little progress; 2
indicates a rudimentary exchange and legal framework; 3 means making some progress (securities
are being issued by private firms, there is some protection of minority shareholders and the
beginnings of a regulatory framework); 4 means that countries have relatively liquid and well-
functioning security markets and effective regulations; while 4+ countries have reached the
standards and performance norms of advanced industrial countries.
These rankings make uncomfortable reading for those who believed that a growing private
sector would drive the emergence of supportive capital market institutions. By 1994, when most
countries had attained significant private sector shares, only five countries had a ranking of 3 in
developing matching capital market and corporate governance mechanisms. All five of these
countries were central European countries that had commenced transition in a relatively advanced
situation: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  The situation had not
improved markedly by 2000.  Ten countries had not altered their category in the five years, and the
situation in financial institutions had actually deteriorated in Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia.  The
main bright spots were Poland and Hungary, which had achieved a ranking of 4 (albeit a 4-), and
the improved rankings in the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (EBRD, 1995, 2000).
These capital market failures were almost certainly an important element in the failure toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
18
improve company performance after privatization in many countries.  Most shares in privatized
companies were either in effect nontradeable or only tradeable in a nontransparent way. Outsiders
were not motivated to purchase majority stakes in firms because the information available to them
before purchase was too weak and their protection from abuse or theft by insiders was insufficient. 
Ownership structures therefore on average changed little or not at all, while asset stripping by
management was rife, particularly in Russia and countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (Aslund, 2000; Estrin and Wright, 1999).
Competition and Trade
The weakness of product market competition has also been particularly serious in the
transition economies. Of course, monopoly power yields firm-specific rents that distort resource
allocation. But in the context of this paper, the important issue is that product market competition
can complement capital market pressures as a mechanism for exercising discipline on management
(Nickell, 1996).
As noted earlier in this paper, many transition economies entered the reform era with highly
concentrated market structures.  In Poland, in 1990, the leading firm had a market share in excess of
30 percent in more than 60 percent of markets, and more than 60 percent in 25 percent of markets
(Newberry and Kattuman, 1992).  Any overall measure of concentration for Russia misses the very
real regional fragmentation of product markets. Even so, Earle and Estrin (1998) find Russia's four-
firm concentration ratios in 1994 have a mean of around 27 percent with a standard deviation of
21.6 percent.  Moreover, 25 percent of the firms surveyed reported that they have no major
competition in their primary market. Brown and Earle (2001) report a relatively high Herfindahl
index across 264 Russian sectors of 0.3, with a standard deviation of 0.156. 
Transition economies had few small firms in 1990, and despite the success of small-scaleWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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privatization programs in most countries (Earle, Frydman and Rapacyzynski, 1993), their impact
has remained relatively slight in much of the region. Table 2 shows that the employment share of
small and middle sized firms (with fewer than 200 employees) was low, and always well below that
found in advanced western economies.
5 The share for small and medium firms is relatively larger in
the countries of central Europe -- Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia -- and the relatively lower share in Russia and the CIS states. However, it may be that
many smaller firms in Russia and the countries of the CIS are involved in informal sector and
illegal activities, and thus are not reported in official data.
Entry of new firms has generally been weak in most transition economies, with the
exceptions of Hungary and Poland.  Poland in particular is frequently held up as the economy that
has nurtured rapid de novo growth (Johnson and Loveman, 1995).  An interesting international
study by Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer (2001) sought to measure "latent entrepreneurship" as
shown, for example, in an individual preference for self-employment as against employment. They
found that latent entrepreneurship is globally highest in Poland (with 80 percent of survey
respondents) as against 70.8 percent in United States, 64 percent in Germany and 45 percent in
United Kingdom. Some transition economies do have very low latent entrepreneurship scores, like
Russia at 33.2 percent and Czech Republic at 36.8 percent, but so do a few western countries, like
Norway at 26.9 percent.  In commenting on these results, Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski
(2000, p. 14) conclude: "[O]ne cannot distinguish between ex-Soviet and mature Western market
economies on the basis of the willingness of their population to undertake self-employment."  
Evidence on the rapid pace of new entry in Poland and the rest of central Europe can be
derived from data on the number of firms, and the size distribution of firms in the early years of
transition (Bratkowski, Grosfeld and Rostowski, 2000). In the Czech Republic, for example, the
total number of firms increased from around 1,600 in 1990 to more than 7,100 in 1994 while theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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average employment of firms decreased, with the share of firms employing fewer than 300 workers
rising from 25 percent to 56 percent. In Hungary, the number of limited liability companies
increased from 19,000 in 1990 to 91,000 by 1994. In Poland, the increase was from 36,000 limited
liability companies in 1990 to 95,000 in 1994. These patterns offer strong evidence of additional
firms, whether created from scratch or by the break-up of existing enterprises.
Nonetheless, entry barriers in transition economies are nonetheless significantly higher than
in the west.  Djankov et al. (2000) address this issue in a study on the regulations for de novo firms
in 75 countries.  Table 3 reproduces their findings on the cost of entry for the transition countries
covered in their survey, in comparison with the United States, Germany and Sweden.  It is
significantly harder, takes longer and is relatively more costly to set up a new firm in all the
transition economies than in western Europe or North America.  However, transition economies
show considerable variation in entry costs: they are surprisingly low in Romania, Ukraine and
Bulgaria, and highest in Hungary, Czech Republic and Russia.  The authors find that entry costs are
correlated with higher corruption and larger unofficial sectors of the economy.
Russia and the nations of the CIS seem to combine low levels of "latent entrepreneurship"
in their populations and high costs of entry, which helps to explain why entry of new firms has been
much slower in Russia and the CIS than in, say, many countries of central Europe.  Russia
continues to have few firms; there were 2.7 million legally registered enterprises in Russia in 1997;
one enterprise per 55 Russians, compared with a ratio of around 1 in 10 in western countries and in
Poland or Hungary.  Although the number of Russian firms is increasing, and the market structure
is tending to become slightly less concentrated (Brown and Earle, 2001), domestic competitive
forces have developed more slowly in Russia than in central Europe.
Foreign trade can also serve as a source of product market competition, so that import
competition substitutes for relatively weak competitive pressures from domestic markets (EstrinWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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and Holmes, 1998).  In fact, increased competition from imports has been one of the most
successful aspects of transition policies, though primarily for the central European countries seeking
accession to the European Union. Table 4 reports scores on trade and foreign exchange
liberalization in 1994 and 2000.  Again, the scores vary on scale from 1 to 4, with 1 representing
widespread import and export control and limited access to foreign exchange and 4+ the benchmark
of advanced industrial economies.  As early as 1994, there were relatively few trade or exchange
controls in central Europe, the Balkans and the Baltic states.
6  Trade liberalization was less
advanced in the Russia and the CIS, but even in Russia, foreign exchange was readily available and
few import restrictions existed.  Trade liberalization had spread even more widely by 2000; 11
transition countries had attained the standards of advanced industrial economies and a further six
had removed all restrictions on trade as well as abolishing discretionary tariffs and introducing free
access to exchange rate markets. However, Russia had slipped somewhat between 1994 and 2000
and several other CIS countries remained at the start of trade liberalization.
This liberalization with respect to international movements of trade and capital has heralded
an extraordinary growth in the trade share in many transition economies, as well as a reorientation
of trade from within the old CMEA trading arrangement within the Soviet bloc toward western
Europe.  For example, trade in Poland increased from 32.7 percent of GDP in 1991 to 43.6 percent
in 1999;  in Hungary from 54.9 percent to 93.8 percent; and in the Czech republic from 66.9 percent
to 104.2 percent.  However, in Russia the trade share dipped from 61.7 in 1993 to 36 percent in
1997, though with the recent rise in oil prices it has since recovered to 62.7 percent.
The forces of competition, both domestic and foreign, could doubtless become more active
in the transition economies. However, the substantial increase in competition that has occurred is
one of the most important contributions to better incentives for efficient corporate governance in
these economies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Enterprise Exit and Hard Budget Constraints
Exit of firms with negative long run profitability is another crucial element in creating
appropriate incentives, both to push managers toward efficient behavior and also for the economy
as a whole to reallocate resources. Given that the transition process entailed a major shift in the
pattern of demand across the economy -- from industry to services, from demand within the
geographic sphere of Soviet bloc planners to world demand, from intermediates to final products --
exit is the mechanism whereby scarce labor, capital and managerial talent departs on its journey
from one use to another. However, exit relies on the existence of "hard budget constraints," so that
firms which are unable to survive in the market place cannot stay afloat through direct or indirect
subsidy. Institutionally, exit relies on the existence and enforcement of bankruptcy laws.  Firms that
are employee owned and /or managerially controlled may choose to remain in operation, even if
expected net present values is negative, if continuation of operations yields significant
nonpecuniary benefits like housing, social benefits or black market opportunities.
Establishing realistic avenues for exit has been a problem in many transition economies.
Many countries had formal arrangements for bankruptcy, but little actual enforcement (EBRD
Report, 2000). There is surprisingly little evidence on exit rates. One example is the work of
Balcerowicz, Gray and Hoshi (1998) on the experience of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland.  They find that government subsidies were withdrawn from firms fairly rapidly in all three
countries.  In the face of large monetary and trade shocks, however, all three countries found
mechanisms for financial accommodation: Poland relied on trade restrictions; the Czech Republic
on increases in bad debts; and Hungary on a large budgetary deficit and bad debts in the banking
system. Overall, the most important reason for failure to reallocate resources through bankruptcy in
the transition economies was not because of legislative weaknesses in the bankruptcy code, norWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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because of direct government subsidies to money-losing firms, but rather because of informal
financial flows from the government sector to failing businesses.
Table 5 reports the share of direct budgetary subsidies to firms (as a percentage of GDP) in
a selection of transition countries from 1991-99.  Subsidies were already very low (less than 2
percent) in a few countries in central Europe and the Baltics in 1991, though they exceeded 5
percent of GDP in a number of countries, including Russia and some CIS states as well as the
Czech Republic and Hungary.  Outside Russia and the CIS, direct government subsidies to firms
had been largely eradicated outside by 1999 (though surprisingly, the direct subsidy share remained
in excess of 5 percent in the Czech Republic).
However, measures of formal subsidy can significantly understate the extent of indirect
government support, especially in Russia and the CIS states. In these countries, weaknesses in the
legal system allowed enterprises to survive when they were consistently losing money. Among the
most important unpaid creditors were employees and suppliers; wages arrears in Russia rose to an
average of six months by 1997 (Earle and Sabirianova, 1998).  One of the most significant
nonpayers was the Russian government itself, which allowed significant arrears to accrue in state-
owned firms and with pensions.  Another important indicator of soft budget constraints was the
remarkable growth in barter payments, which exceeded 40 percent of enterprise sales in 1997 in
Russia, and was only marginally less in Ukraine (Estrin and Rosevear, 1999). Barter facilitates tax
avoidance and evasion. For example, it is hard to calculated a value-added tax in a setting where no
monetary value is placed on bartered products. In some cases, enterprises were able to trade tax
debt for product orders. Indeed, barter can be considered a mechanism whereby the state provided
large enterprises with tax subsidies (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998).
The enterprise reform process has seen an array of policies: privatization and new forms of
corporate governance; encouragement of entry, exit and trade liberalization; and weakening theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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financial relationship between the state and enterprise sector.  The story of enterprise reform is still
evolving. Considerable work remains to be done, for example, in identifying the extent of
competition and the amount of exit, as well as figuring out the effects of different constellations of
policies. The variation in policies across transition economies is large, providing an important
laboratory to test the impact of particular packages on enterprise performance and restructuring.
Policies and Enterprise Reform: Empirical Findings
There is now a substantial literature on the determinants of enterprise restructuring in
transition economies.  The most complete recent survey by Djankov and Murrell (2000) cites 89
studies on the impact of privatization; 29 analyses of managerial turnover; 17 on product market
competition and 10 on hard budget constraints.  Other summaries include Carlin and Landesmann
(1997), Estrin and Wright (1999), Nellis (2000) and Commander, Dutz and Stern (2000).  Here, we
survey the main results established in this literature.
The impact of privatization on the performance of firms in transition economies has for the
most part been positive.  However, the privatization effect is significantly stronger in central Europe
than in the Russia and the CIS countries; in most cases, the impact is around twice the size
(Djankov and Murrell, 2000).  For example, in Poland the difference in sales growth rate between
private and state-owned firms is estimated to be between 5.4 and 8.7 percent; and in central Europe
the difference in productivity between to be 4.3 percent.  In contrast, the findings for Russia and
CIS state are more mixed, with some studies indicating positive performance effects from
privatization and other zero or even a negative effect (Estrin and Wright, 1999).
These positive effects of privatization were not apparent in reviews of the literature a few
years ago (for example, Carlin and Landesmann, 1997), which suggests that the impact ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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privatization on company performance was not immediate.  However, while the weight of the
evidence has clearly shifted in favour of positive privatization effects in central Europe (Frydman et
al, 1999; Claessens and Djankov, 1999), few positive effects have been identified yet in Russia or
CIS (Earle and Estrin, 1997; Estrin and Rosevear, 1999; Bevan et al., 2001b). 
One warning about all of these privatization results is that the firms were not selected
randomly for privatization, but were chosen for political and economic reasons. It may be, for
example, that firms more likely to survive on their own were also more likely to be privatized.
Although some studies have tried to grapple with this issue, it is intrinsically difficult, and it raises a
question about the robustness of all results relating to the effects of privatization.
The empirical evidence confirms the expectation that the identity of the eventual owner
affects the outcome of privatization. As discussed earlier, privatization has resulted in a wide
variety of ownership structures: large-scale insider ownership by workers and managers, diffuse
private ownership, ownership concentrated in investment funds, a few traditional "strategic
owners," and foreign investors. Based on 23 studies, Djankov and Murrell (2000, p. 33) conclude
that differences in ownership are very important:  "Privatization to workers is detrimental,
privatization to diffuse individual owners has no effect and privatization to Funds or foreigners has
a large positive effect."  They find that privatization to investment funds is five times as productive
as privatization to insiders, and privatization to foreigners or blockholders is three times as
productive as privatization to insiders.  Banks and blockholders on average improve company
performance about as much as foreign owners.  One interpretation of these findings is that the
concentration of ownership is crucial, since blockholders, funds, foreigners and banks all have
concentrated holdings.  The impact of concentrated holdings is also significant in individual
studies; for example, Claessens and Djankov (1999) show that a 10 percent increase in the
percentage of shares held by the largest five shareholders is the Czech Republic raises laborWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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productivity by 5 percent.
The relatively poor performance of Russia and the CIS countries in the impact of
privatization can therefore be explained by two factors.  The first factor is the preponderance of a
relatively less effective form of private ownership – specifically, dispersed worker ownership.  The
second factor is the poor functioning of legal and corporate governance mechanisms and the
competitive market environment, which has meant that worker owners have been less effective in
improving performance than in countries with a stronger institutional framework, such as Poland
(Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski, 2000).
It is hard to test the impact of differences in corporate governance on enterprise
performance. Many of the independent variables vary by country rather than by firm, so that it is
hard to disentangle differences in corporate goverance from country-specific effects.  However,
studies that have focused on managerial turnover suggest that new managers lead to higher
productivity, by 6.2 percent in Czech Republic and 7.3 percent in central Europe (Claessens and
Djankov, 1999; Barberis et al. 1996). Similarly, managerial bonus schemes appear to raise total
factor productivity; doubling the manager's bonus increases total factor productivity growth by 7.4
percent.
Product market competition has proved to be another important factor in raising company
productivity. The results across 67 analyses in 17 papers reported by Djankov and Murrell (2000)
look at both domestic and import competition, and then measure the effect on the level of total
factor productivity, productivity growth, or price-cost margins. The studies suggest that both
domestic and import competition play a significant role in improving company performance. 
However, once again the effects are more robust for Central Europe. The findings for Russia and
CIS are typically not significant, although Brown and Earle (2001) do find significant results for
Russia and the CIS states.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Hardness of budget constraints is also an important factor in stimulating enterprise
restructuring.  Early studies of Poland found that restructuring occurred in state-owned firms prior
to privatization, provided budget constraints were hard (for example, Pinto, Belka and Krajewski,
1993). Ten papers have explored the issue econometrically, and they confirm the positive impact of
hard budget constraints on total factor productivity, productivity or sales growth. Again, the effect
is highly significant in the studies in the non-CIS countries but less consistent for Russia and the
CIS states. It is harder to measure the impact of soft budget constraints that are delivered in indirect
forms. However, policies which break the links between important economic institutions and the
state, like privatization of utilities or the banking sector, probably enhance enterprise performance. 
Hence, the private sector share of GDP may itself be an important influence on of the impact of
privatization.
Conclusions
The transition countries began with very different initial conditions and have since
employed a variety of policies with respect to privatization, price and trade liberalization,
competition and enterprise support.  A few conclusions emerge from this survey of the determinants
of enterprise performance.
Initial conditions in the sense of the degree of central planning or the extent of structural
macroeconomic imbalances do not appear to have been a fundamental determinant of either reform
paths chosen or of subsequent economic performance.  Both relatively more reformed economies
before the transition -- like Slovenia, Hungary and Poland -- along with relatively less reformed
ones  -- like the Czech Republic and some countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union
like Estonia, and Latvia -- are all among the current leaders among transition economies (EuropeanWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000). However, none of the initially advanced
countries have fallen seriously behind.
There does appear to be a sharp distinction in terms of policies followed and their impact
between central Europe on the one hand and Russia and the CIS countries on the other. The reasons
for these divergences are complex, and may stem from fundamentally different political attitudes
towards reform (Aslund, 2000).  The economies of central Europe were led by legitimate
governments elected on platforms of reform, while the reformers in Russia and many of the CIS
countries represented a small but powerful political group advising the president but opposed by
much of the parliamentary and civil service structure.  Moreover, governments in Russia and other
CIS countries had to make compromises in introducing policies to build internal political support
for reform, perhaps because they faced more deeply entrenched managerial interests. This pattern
resulted in reforms that were less conducive to improved enterprise performance and restructuring,
notably with respect to privatization methods, corporate governance, competition and subsidy.
Moreover, many central European countries waned to integrate into the European Union, which 
provided their governments with additional legitimacy in the adoption of western European laws
and institutions. Taken together, these factors imply inferior performance in economic restructuring
in Russia and the CIS.
Finally, transition policies underlying enterprise restructuring must be regarded as
complements, not substitutes.  Privatization alone will not be enough; enterprise reform will also
require effective corporate governance and hard budget constraints. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Table 1: Methods of Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe
PRIMARY METHOD SECONDARY METHOD
COUNTRY Direct sales MEBOs
*
Vouchers Direct sales MEBOs* Vouchers
Albania + +
Armenia + +
Azerbaijan + +
Belarus + +
Bulgaria + +
Croatia + +
Czech Republic + +
Estonia + +
FYR Macedonia + +
Georgia + +
Hungary + +
Kazakhstan + +
Kyrgyzstan + +
Latvia + +
Lithuania + +
Moldova + +
Poland + +
Romania + +
Russia + +
Slovak Republic + +
Slovenia + +
Tajikistan + +
Turkmenistan + +
Ukraine + +
Uzbekistan + +
Source: EBRD (1998)
*  Management employee buyoutsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Table 2: Percentage of Employment in SMEs, 1994
Country % Employment
Belarus 6
Croatia 30
Czech Republic 37
Estonia 45
FYR Macedonia 37
Hungary 24
Kyrgyzstan 3
Poland 23
Romania 27
Russia 10
Slovenia 23
Slovak republic 19
EU 12 69
USA 53
Japan 76
Source: EBRD (1995)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Table 3: Costs of Entry
Country Number of Procedures
for entry
a
Time for entry (days)
b Cost of entry
(% GDP per capita)
c
Bulgaria 11 20 16.5
Croatia 14 77 86.8
Czech Republic 11 97 25.1
Georgia 12 70 28
Hungary 10 53 81
Kazakhstan 12 31 12.5
Kyrgyzstan 9 23 20
Latvia 7 20 27.7
Lithuania 13 66 42.4
Poland 10 26 28
Romania 11 68 11.4
Russia 16 69 37.8
Slovakia 12 110.5 13.1
Slovenia 9 35 7.1
Ukraine 11 21 19.7
US 4 7 9.6
Germany 7 90 8.5
Sweden 4 17 2.5
Source: Djankov et al (2000)
a – Total number of procedures required in order for a firm to set up, in five categories: health and safety,
environment, tax, labor and screening.
b – Time represents the number of days required to undertake these procedures.
c – Direct cost of entry procedures, calculated as a percentage of annual per capita GDP.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Table 4: Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation
Country 1994 2000
Albania 4 4+
Armenia 2 4
Azerbaijan 1 3+
Belarus 1 2-
Bulgaria 4 4+
Croatia 4 4+
Czech Republic 4 4+
Estonia 4 4+
FYR Macedonia 4 4
Georgia 4 4+
Hungary 4 4+
Kazakhstan 2 3+
Kyrgyzstan 3 4
Latvia 4 4+
Lithuania 4 4
Moldova 2 4
Poland 4 4+
Romania 4 4
Russia 3 2+
Slovak Republic 4 4+
Slovenia 4 4+
Tajikistan 1 3+
Turkmenistan 1 1
Ukraine 1 3
Uzbekistan 2 1
Source: EBRD (1994, 2000)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Table 5: Budgetary Subsidies to Firms (% GDP)
Country 1991 1994 1997 1999
Azerbaijan 11.2a 5.4 0.7 0.1b
Belarus 8.7a 6.3 1.3 5.6b
Bulgaria 2.0 1.3 0.8 1.5
Croatia 3.9 2.0 1.9 2.4
Czech Republic 6.4c 7.1 7.8 7.7
Estonia 1.5 0.9 0.3 6.9
Georgia - 13.8 1.5 2.1
Hungary 6.6 5.9 4.9 4.8
Latvia - 0.2 0.4 5.5
Lithuania 1.4 1.7 0.9 -
Poland 3.3 1.2 0.8 0.4
Romania 13.0a 3.8 2.6 1.9
Russia - 8.1d 8.2 5.3
Slovakia 4.0a 3.2 2.2 1.7
Slovenia 2.8 1.6 1.3
Ukraine - 13.3 5.0 -
a = 1992
b = 1998
c = 1993
d = 1996
Source: EBRD (2000)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 431
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Endnotes
1. Evidence from restructuring the military sector in market economies, in periods of declining
defense spending, suggests that this might rely disproportionately on entry rather than reorientation
of existing suppliers.
2. Indeed, the notion of "soft budget constraints" -- that is, a situation where firms in theory faced
real profits and losses but in practice government actions tended to soak up profits and make up
losses -- was invented to describe post-1968 Hungary (Kornai, 1980).
3. Accession to the European Union accession meant that the aspiring members had to accept the
EU legal framework "off the shelf."  This blanket adoption of new laws may have disadvantages in
certain fields -- for example, Estrin and Homes (1998) discuss problems that may arise with regard
to competition policy -- but overall it provided a driver to more effective institutional and legal
reform.
4. For studies of equity ownership in privatized Russian firms using data from 1993 to about 1997,
see Earle, Estrin and Leshchenko (1996), Buck et al. (1996), Blasi, Kroumova and Kruse (1997),
Jones (1998), Wright, Buck and Filatotchev (1998), Buck et al. (1999) and Aukutsionek et al.
(1998). The sample size of these surveys ranges from 100 to 350 firms. Broadly speaking, they
confirm the conclusions in the paragraph about the high share of insider employee ownership.
5. The OECD definition of small and medium enterprises is fewer than 500 employees, but the
alternative definition makes little difference here, since there were few firms in Central and Eastern
Europe in the 200-500 employee range at this time.
6. In 1994, the EBRD scale did not include a ranking of 4+. 
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